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RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS 
AND—AND AMONG—CIVIL RIGHTS: 
SEPARATION, TOLERATION, AND 
ACCOMMODATION 
RICHARD W. GARNETT* 
I. 
Americans recently marked and celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 During the past half-century, a 
wide variety of antidiscrimination laws, civil rights protections, and equal 
access rules have been enacted by the full range of authorities and 
jurisdictions, from small towns to the United Nations.2 These measures, in 
addition to a broad array of policies and programs having to do with 
education, voting rights, social welfare, and economic opportunity, have in 
many ways helped to make more real what might otherwise have remained 
only an ideal of “equal citizenship.”3 As President Barack Obama remarked 
 
 *. Professor of Law and Concurrent Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame. 
Portions of this essay were presented at a conference, “Religious Accommodation in the Age of Civil 
Rights,” held at Harvard Law School on April 3–5, 2014. The conference was co-sponsored by Harvard 
Law School, the Williams Institute, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the USC Center for Law, 
History and Culture. I am grateful to the conference conveners—Nomi Stolzenberg, Douglas NeJaime, 
Mark Tushnet, and Nan Hunter—for including me in the conference and to my fellow participants for 
stimulating presentations and discussions. Thanks are also due to Nathan Chapman, Mare DeGirolami, 
Michael Helfand, John Inazu, Kristine Kalanges, Randy Kozel, Michael Moreland, Nelson Tebbe, and 
Jeffrey Pojanowski for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000a et seq (2012)). 
 2. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014), for a 
recent scholarly reflection on the Civil Rights Revolution and its implications for the American 
constitution. 
 3. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977) (“A society devoted to the idea of equal 
citizenship, then, will repudiate those inequalities that impose the stigma of caste and thus ‘belie the 
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on the anniversary of the Act, it “brought us closer to making real the 
declaration at the heart of our founding—that we are all created equal.”4 
We continue to disagree, reasonably even if strongly, about the precise 
content of this ideal, the best ways to implement it, and its coherence.5 
Even if the “idea of equality” is not entirely “empty,”6 it is certainly more 
easily and more often admired than understood.7 This is not surprising and 
does not detract from its being a shared ideal. In any event, and in the 
President’s words, the “journey continues.”8 
It is a premise of the articles and essays in this volume and of the 
conference at which they were initially presented that we are, and have 
been for some time, living in an “age of civil rights.” The developments 
mentioned in the previous paragraph provide a strong foundation for this 
premise. As we remember and reflect upon it, we might also recall that, not 
that long ago, we marked and celebrated another anniversary, the sixtieth 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.9 The 
Declaration—which, like the Civil Rights Act, both reflected and advanced 
a “revolution” in our laws and views—identified the right to freedom of 
religion as a fundamental right, grounded in the “inherent dignity” that 
every person, because he or she is a person, and in “equal” measure, 
bears.10 This right to religious freedom includes the “freedom, either alone 
or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest . . . religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance.”11 That is, at the heart of what Michael Perry calls the 
 
principle that people are of equal ultimate worth.’” (quoting ROBERT E. RODES, JR., THE LEGAL 
ENTERPRISE 163 (1976))). 
 4. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the 50th Anniversary 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (July 2, 2014) [hereinafter Obama Press Release], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/02/statement-president-50th-anniversary-civil-
rights-act-1964. 
 5. See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA (2001). 
 6. Cf. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
 7. See generally JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY 
OF A WESTERN INSIGHT (1999). 
 8. Obama Press Release, supra note 4. 
 9. December 10, 2008 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Declaration. 60th Anniversary 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/events/humanrightsday/udhr60/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2015). See MARY ANN 
GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2001), for a narrative about the group of men and women who had primary 
responsibility for writing and winning the adoption of the Declaration. 
 10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), 
pmbl., art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 11. Id. art. 18. 
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“morality of human rights” is the claim—the commitment, really—that 
every human person is “inviolable.” One manifestation or implication of 
this “inviolability” is the right to religious freedom.12 
Now, it is not entirely clear—it is and will be reasonably contested—
what this right includes and entails, what it permits, and what it rules out. I 
take it that it involves more than a particular person’s right to believe (or 
not) in God, to pray (or not) in private, and to worship and engage in ritual 
or liturgical practices (or not) in distinctively religious gatherings. The 
Declaration on Human Rights is, again, clear on this point and, certainly, 
there is a long tradition in the United States of regarding religious freedom 
or liberty as attaching not only to matters of private profession or interior 
confession but also to “the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the 
manner of discharging it.”13 “Religion,” said Justice William Douglas in 
his Wisconsin v. Yoder opinion, “is an individual experience.”14 The 
opinion was a partial dissent and this statement is partially correct. 
However, it does not tell the entire story. Many “religious experiences” are 
those of monks, mystics, and prophets—and of salesmen, coaches, 
teachers, and cops. But, many are also of peoples, tribes, communities, and 
congregations. As Justice Douglas’s colleague, Justice William Brennan, 
insisted in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, “[f]or many individuals, religious 
activity derives meaning in large measure from participation in a larger 
religious community. Such a community represents an ongoing tradition of 
shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of 
individuals.”15 
“Religion” is famously difficult (some would say impossible) to 
define. The distinctions among religion, on the one hand, and culture, 
 
 12. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 15–18 (2010). As 
Perry notes, the Universal Declaration is, along with the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, part of the 
“International Bill of Rights.” Id. at 15. The former Covenant “largely repeats the capacious guarantee 
of religious rights and liberties first announced in the [Universal Declaration].” JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL 
A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 271 (3d ed. 2011). 
 13. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. 16 (1776). See also MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., 
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 125 (3d ed. 2011) (“Each of the state constitutions first defined the 
scope of the free exercise right in terms of the conscience of the individual believer and the actions that 
flow from that conscience. None of the provisions confined the protection to beliefs and 
opinions . . . nor to expression of beliefs and opinions . . . .”); WITTE, JR., supra note 12, at 45 (noting 
that for most eighteenth century writers, religious practices were inseparable from religious beliefs). 
 14. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
 15. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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tradition, identity, and politics, on the other, are much more contested than 
clear.16 We can safely say, though, that the idea that religion is or involves 
only, or even primarily, an interior, individual experience is relatively new 
on the scene. In any event, and again, religion in our experience and 
understanding involves more than—even if it certainly does involve—the 
commitments, values, beliefs, professions, and practices of particular 
persons. It also involves—and it is exercised both by and through—
communities, families, associations, societies, authorities, assemblies, and 
institutions.17 
What the freedom of religion includes—specifically, whether it 
includes a right to reasonable accommodation in cases when the application 
of general laws would impose a substantial and avoidable burden—is one 
of the questions the various pieces in this volume address.18 Others include, 
for example, whether “religious” practices, objections, and motivations do 
or should have a stronger claim for accommodation than other 
“conscientious” or “deeply held” ones;19 whether the Free Exercise Clause 
authorizes judges to accommodate religion by requiring exemptions from 
generally applicable laws or instead invites politically accountable actors to 
do so;20 and whether and to what extent the Establishment Clause or 
principles of political morality constrain attempts by judicial or political 
 
 16. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH, RELIGION IN HUMAN EVOLUTION: FROM THE PALEOLITHIC TO 
THE AXIAL AGE xiv (2011); WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE: SECULAR 
IDEOLOGY AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN CONFLICT 33 (2009); BRENT NONGBRI, BEFORE RELIGION: A 
HISTORY OF A MODERN CONCEPT 15–22 (2013); WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY 
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 89–137 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the 
Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1920–21 (2009); Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The 
Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 793–94 (1997); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of 
Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1060–63 (1978). 
 17. I have tried to develop this point elsewhere. See generally Richard W. Garnett, Church, 
State, and the Practice of Love, 52 VILL. L. REV. 281 (2007); Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group 
Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515 (2007); 
Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) an Exposition, Translation, and 
Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013) [hereinafter Garnett, Freedom of the Church]. 
 18. As Witte observes, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—again, 
part of the “International Bill of Rights”—provides that the “[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or 
beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” WITTE, JR., 
supra note 12, at 271. 
 19. Compare, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 
with, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
308 (1991). 
 20. Compare, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 
with, e.g., William K. Kelley, The Primacy of Political Actors in Accommodation of Religion, 22 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 403 (2000). 
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actors to remove substantial burdens from religious exercise.21 Especially 
in the wake of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores22 and Elane Photography v. 
Willock,23 scholars, judges, and practitioners alike will continue to wrestle 
with the specific technical and doctrinal challenges involved in the 
operation of a religious-accommodation regime like the one set out in the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)24 and similar statutes. What 
is, for that regime’s purposes anyway, “religion” or “religious exercise” or 
the “exercise of religion”? Are these laws’ protections fully available to 
for-profit business corporations and in the economic and commercial 
spheres? What constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise and 
to what extent should judges and other government officials defer to a 
religious believer’s claim that such a burden exists? What criteria should be 
employed by courts when determining whether a government interest is 
“compelling”? Is the political or financial feasibility of an alternative 
means of furthering that compelling government interest relevant to the 
question whether the means at issue is the “least restrictive” one? And so 
on.25 The point here is simply that, as we consider and answer these 
questions, we should keep in view the fact that the right to religious 
freedom is one of those civil rights—it is, again, a fundamental human 
right, grounded on the “inherent dignity and . . . equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family”26—the increased appreciation 
of which is plausibly said to characterize our “age.”27  
 
 21. Compare, e.g., Carl. H. Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of the 
Recent Confusion, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883 (2001), with, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With 
Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743 (1992). 
 22. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 23. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). 
 24. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012)). 
 25. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty 
After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010). 
 26. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10, pmbl. See also POPE PAUL VI, 
DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (DIGNITATIS HUMANAE) ON THE RIGHT OF THE PERSON AND 
OF COMMUNITIES TO SOCIAL AND CIVIL FREEDOM IN MATTERS RELIGIOUS para. 2 (Dec. 7, 1965), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html (“[T]he right to religious freedom has its foundation in 
the very dignity of the human person . . . .”). 
 27. Abner Greene emphasized this point in his presentation at the Harvard Law School 
conference, “Religious Accommodation in the Age of Civil Rights.” See Abner S. Greene, Religious 
Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties: Is There a Middle Ground?, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
(forthcoming 2015). 
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II. 
A conference or symposium topic like “Religious Accommodation in 
the Age of Civil Rights” invites and prompts at least two lines of inquiry. 
Proceeding along the first, and in keeping with the claims proposed in the 
preceding section, we might ask and argue about whether our religious 
accommodation practices are all that they should be in our “age of civil 
rights.” Are accommodations and exemptions being extended prudently but 
generously, in as many cases and to as many persons and entities as 
possible, in a sincere effort to welcome religious minorities, objectors, and 
dissenters as fully as we can into what Justice Harlan called “the dignity 
and glory of American citizenship”?28 What barriers exist to the promotion 
and achievement of civil rights goals through religious accommodations 
and how might these barriers be overcome?29 Are civil rights laws being 
designed and enforced in ways that guard against unintended or unjustified 
disregard for or sacrifices of the civil (and human) right to religious liberty 
in the pursuit or protection of others? 
It is a fact that “[i]n a society that is pervasively regulated, as ours 
now is”30—and in a society that is religiously pluralistic and divided on 
serious moral questions, as ours now is31—“there are many more occasions 
for conflict between the government and religious actors.”32 In this 
volume’s articles and essays, as at the conference when they were 
presented, we encounter and engage such conflicts, clashes, and tensions. 
They are real and, like the civil rights enterprise itself, are difficult and 
pressing. Still, proceeding down this first avenue, the demands of “the age 
of civil rights” are seen as including a commitment to the inclusion and 
protection of the religious believers and groups involved in these conflicts 
and a determination to respect their place in the civitas rather than to insist 
on boundaries, loyalties, and conditions that exclude or “shut [them] out.”33 
There is, though, at least one other way to approach the topic. A 
second avenue of inquiry presumes that the dynamic at issue is—as a USA 
Today headline recently put it34—“[r]eligious liberty vs. civil rights” rather 
 
 28. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 29. Cf. Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1815 (2011). 
 30. MCCONNELL, ET AL., supra note 13, at 121. 
 31. Cf. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION 
DIVIDES AND UNITES US (2010). 
 32. MCCONNELL, ET AL., supra note 13, at 121. 
 33. Cf. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, 
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993). 
 34. Richard Wolf, Religious Liberty vs. Civil Rights: A Balancing Act, USA TODAY (Feb. 28, 
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than “religious freedom and, and among, civil rights.”35 This dynamic 
played out in the failed effort to enact the Religious Liberty Protection Act 
(“RLPA”) in the late 1990s, after the Supreme Court ruled that the RFRA, 
as applied to states and local governments, exceeded the power of 
Congress.36 As Douglas Laycock and others have recounted, the broad 
coalition that produced unanimous and near-unanimous votes in Congress 
for RFRA broke down for RLPA after civil rights advocacy groups insisted 
on a “global exception for any civil rights claim”: “[T]he bill died in party-
line acrimony.”37 The same dynamic is also at work in the current and 
roiling arguments about whether and to what extent religious employers 
should be accommodated in the Affordable Care Act’s preventive-services 
mandate or exempted from antidiscrimination laws requiring recognition of 
same-sex marriages or the provision of services in connection with same-
sex couples’ marriage or commitment ceremonies.38 This approach tends to 
produce a narrative in which religious liberty claims and claimants are 
difficulties to be managed, obstacles to be negotiated, or even enemies to 
be defeated.39 
There is no way or need to deny that some religious liberty claims and 
policies are in tension, and even in conflict, with some other civil rights 
claims and policies. True, it is sometimes declared that such conflict does 
not, or does not really, exist—that it presents a “false choice.” But such 
declarations generally involve an attempt to dissolve or evaporate the 
conflict by imposing a contested definition or boundary on “real” religious 
liberty.40 If “religious liberty” does not include a “right to discriminate” 
 
2014, 12:28 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/27/arizona-religion-gays-
lesbians-supreme-court/5872879. 
 35. This dynamic was the theme, for example, of an eight-part New York Times series, “In God’s 
Name,” that ran several years ago on the ways—many of which were presented as troubling—that 
governments accommodate religious entities by exempting them from otherwise applicable laws. In 
God’s Name, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/business/churchstate.html (last visited Mar. 22, 
2015). 
 36. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
 37. Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 407, 412–13 (2011). 
 38. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious 
Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (2012); 
Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 703 
(2014). See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas 
Laycock et al., eds., 2008). 
 39. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
839; Steven D. Smith, Live and Let Live? The Asymmetry of Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 
(2015). 
 40. See, e.g., Joshua Dorner, Religious Liberty for Some or Religious Liberty for All?, CENTER 
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-
  
500 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:493 
then, obviously, there is very little conflict between “religious liberty” and 
antidiscrimination laws. But, in fact, religious liberty does sometimes 
include a right to discriminate in ways that would otherwise violate civil 
rights laws.41 The tension between religious liberty and (other) civil rights 
is, sometimes, real, but this fact is unremarkable and should be 
unsurprising. Certainly, the civil right to religious freedom is not the only 
civil right the exercise of which sometimes bumps up against the exercise 
of others. 
Although it cannot plausibly be defined away or declared illusory, it is 
still crucial to remember that this tension is among civil rights claims. One 
need not believe (although I do) that religious freedom is importantly basic, 
prior, fundamental, and “infrastructural”42—that it is a necessary condition 
for the meaningful enjoyment and reliable protection of other human and 
civil rights43—to appreciate this point. The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is a “civil rights” act. And 
that particular “civil rights” act, like many others, recognizes a presumptive 
right to accommodation and embodies a promise of equal regard as a 
means of achieving equal access, participation, membership, and 
citizenship.44 So, when we discuss the feasibility, or the justifiability, or the 
wisdom, of religious accommodations, we are not discussing something 
external, or alien, or hostile to the character of our “age” or to the 
enterprise of “civil rights under and through law.” We are, instead, taking 
up a question, and a challenge, that is inherent in that enterprise. 
Of course, many scholars and others believe and contend that 
“singling out” religious or religiously motivated activities, beliefs, and 
commitments, as such, for protection or accommodation is unwarranted, 
 
liberties/report/2013/12/12/80968/religious-liberty-for-some-or-religious-liberty-for-all; S. Alan Ray, 
How Religion and Rights Align on Campus, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 15, 2014, at A56. 
 41. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132, S. Ct. 694, 707 
(2012) (holding that there is a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment). See generally Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and the Nondiscrimination Norm, 
in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND ITS 
LIMITS 194 (Austin Sarat, ed., 2012). 
 42. See, e.g., Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 17; Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches 
Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273 (2008) 
[hereinafter Garnett, Do Churches Matter?]. 
 43. See Daniel Philpott, Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion, 101 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 505 (2007), for a compelling account of the ways that religious freedom and “consensual 
differentiation” between religious and political authority help to promote democratization and 
development. 
 44. Cf., e.g., Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Reasonable Accommodations Under the 
ADA: The Supreme Court in Barnett, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 361 (2002). 
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and even unjust. Religion, in other words, is not “special.”45 On this view, 
any accommodations or exemptions from general laws that are specific to 
religion would be defensible, if at all, only on prudential or pragmatic 
grounds. I believe, though, that “religion is special”—indeed, as my former 
colleague John Garvey once put it, that “religion is a good thing”46—and 
that this is one reason why it and religious freedom may, are, and should be 
singled out for special treatment, and special respect, in our constitutions, 
laws, traditions, and practices.47 The fact that we are in an “age of civil 
rights”—like the facts that our political communities are increasingly 
diverse in values and beliefs and our governments’ regulatory aims and 
activities have expanded—gives rise to new challenges and arguably 
complicates the enterprise of appropriately protecting religious freedom 
among and along with other civil and human rights. It is not, however, a 
reason or an occasion for abandoning or downgrading that enterprise. 
My impression of both the current academic and political debates is 
that this second approach to the topic—that is, the one that approaches 
religious authorities, religious teachings, and religious believers’ claims or 
requests for accommodations as obstacles to the civil rights enterprise—is, 
or is becoming, the prevailing one. This was true, it is fair to say, of the 
Harvard Law School conference at which the articles and essays in this 
volume and others were presented. As a general matter, religious 
exemptions and accommodations are increasingly seen as departures from 
the rule of law, as special and unjustified benefits for powerful interests, as 
threats to the progress made in the cause of racial justice, or as 
disingenuous ploys by those hostile to abortion rights or legal recognition 
of same-sex marriage. It is, as many have observed, extremely unlikely that 
the RFRA would be enacted today, let alone enacted with near-unanimous 
and bipartisan support, and, in fact, the Hobby Lobby ruling has prompted 
some calls to modify or even repeal the Act.48 As Paul Horwitz has noted, 
the reaction to Hobby Lobby may signal and speed “the collapse of a 
national consensus on a key element of religious liberty: 
 
 45. Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012). 
 46. John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 275, 283 (1996). See also Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in 
Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1991). 
 47. See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 
(2000) (“‘[S]ingling out religion’ for special constitutional protection is fully consistent with our 
constitutional tradition.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Editorial, Congress Should Narrow the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, WASH. 
POST (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-should-narrow-the-religious-
freedom-restoration-act/2014/06/30/096af01a-009b-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html. 
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accommodation.”49 What Steven Smith has described as “secular 
egalitarianism” seems to be increasingly influential and “there are reasons,” 
as he warns, “to doubt the capacity or willingness of secular egalitarianism 
to cherish religious freedom.”50 In a similar vein, Laycock reported almost 
twenty years ago that “[m]any secularists see little reason to accommodate 
an incomprehensible superstition that has lingered beyond its time, and 
many modernist believers see no reason why anyone’s religious belief 
should affect the pursuit of public policy.”51 
If Horwitz is correct—and I am inclined to think that he is—about the 
“collapse of a . . . consensus” on the importance of accommodation and 
exemptions as means of respecting religious freedom while negotiating and 
navigating our country’s pluralism and diversity, then the responses of 
those who celebrate our “age of civil rights” should be concern and regret. 
This collapse, if that is what it is, is a setback and not a step forward for the 
civil rights project, correctly understood. When political authorities are 
unwilling, or lose the will, to acknowledge and respect the priority of our 
“first freedom,”52 other human rights are vulnerable. The civil rights 
enterprise ought to aim for the enriching of civil society through the 
practice of what John Inazu calls a “confident pluralism”53—a practice that 
includes a generous policy of religious accommodation. 
III. 
The shared goal of the articles and essays in this volume is not—or, at 
least, it should not be—to definitively resolve or define out of existence the 
tensions and conflicts we observe in cases like Hobby Lobby, Elane 
Photography, Hosanna-Tabor, or Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.54 It 
is—or, at least, it should be—to help and to challenge authors and readers 
alike to more fully and sympathetically understand all that is at stake in 
 
 49. Paul Horwitz, Op-Ed., Hobby Lobby Is Only the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/opinion/for-the-supreme-court-hobby-lobby-is-only-the-
beginning.html. See also Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014). 
 50. Steven D. Smith, Religious Freedom and Its Enemies, or Why the Smith Decision May Be a 
Greater Loss Now Than It Was Then, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2033, 2052 (2011). 
 51. Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The 
Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1098 (1996). 
 52. See Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2000). James Madison memorably contended that the “duty” to “render to the 
Creator . . . homage” is “precedent both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of 
Civil Society.” Id. at 1246 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments § 1 (1785)).  
 53. John D. Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 587 (2015). 
 54. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
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these and similar cases. 
My own thinking about religious accommodation in the age of civil 
rights is pluralistic in at least two ways.55 First, it is pluralistic in the 
familiar sense that it accepts as given, unavoidable, permanent, and human 
the fact that people, associations, institutions, and communities reasonably 
disagree about things that matter.56 To be sure, pluralism is not (or need not 
be) relativism. Still, we and our governments should acknowledge and 
accept our limited competence and prerogative to resolve or dissolve our 
moral disagreements. We and our governments should resign ourselves—
comforted, perhaps, by the “spirit of liberty” as described by Judge Learned 
Hand57—to the “crooked timber” of free society.58 There are “many 
reasonable . . . worldviews that are compatible with good citizenship, and it 
is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt to forge agreement.”59 It is not 
necessary—in fact, it is self-defeating—for liberalism to insist on 
liberalism “all the way down.”60 The “logic of congruence”61 is antithetical 
to the civil rights enterprise as I understand it. 
My approach to the topic is also pluralistic in another, related sense.62 
It proceeds from what Mark DeWolfe Howe described as,  
the conviction that government must recognize that it is not the sole 
possessor of sovereignty, and that private groups within the community 
are entitled to lead their own free lives and exercise within the area of 
their competence an authority so effective as to justify labeling it a 
 
 55. “Pluralism,” in political and legal theory, is—to put it mildly—a complicated and rich 
subject and I will not make any attempt here to treat it in depth. For thoughtful and recent studies, see 
JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM, PLURALISM, AND FREEDOM (2015), and VICTOR M. MUÑIZ-
FRATICELLI, THE STRUCTURE OF PLURALISM (2014). Parts of what follows from this point are taken 
from Garnett, supra note 41. 
 56. For a more developed account of pluralism in this sense, see Inazu, supra note 53. 
 57. In his May 21, 1944 speech at the “I Am an American Day” event in New York City’s 
Central Park, Judge Hand said that “[t]he spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is 
right.” Judge Learned Hand, The “Spirit of Liberty” Speech at New York City’s “I Am an American 
Day” (May 21, 1944) (transcript available at http://www.providenceforum.org/spiritoflibertyspeech). 
 58. See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF 
IDEAS (Henry Hardy ed., 2d ed. 2013). 
 59. Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453, 454 
(2000) (footnote omitted). 
 60. See Larry Alexander, Illiberalism All the Way Down: Illiberal Groups and Two Conceptions 
of Liberalism, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 625 (2002). 
 61. See generally Nancy L. Rosenblum, Democratic Character and Community: The Logic of 
Congruence?, 2 J. POL. PHIL. 67 (1994). 
 62. For more on this “second sense,” see Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 17, at 39 
(“[C]onstitutionalism relies, both in theory and in fact, not only on the separation and limitation of the 
powers of the political authority, but also on the existence and the health of authorities and associations 
outside, and meaningfully independent of, that political authority, or ‘the state’.”). 
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sovereign authority. To make this assertion is to suggest that private 
groups have liberties similar to those of individuals and that those 
liberties, as such, are to be secured by law from governmental 
infringement.63 
Now, we can debate the extent to which it is helpful to use, as Howe 
did, the term “sovereign” to describe nonstate authorities,64 but to embrace 
pluralism is to acknowledge the reality of these authorities, to deny that 
nonstate authority exists and is exercised only by state concession,65 to 
“refuse[] to limit the domain of law to the law of the state,”66 and to accept 
that “[w]ithin society, as distinct from the state, there is room for the 
independent exercise of an authority which is not that of the state.”67 
In keeping with this second sense, I have proposed elsewhere that 
religious institutions, communities, and groups are nonstate authorities that 
play important structural and “infrastructural” roles in the social and legal 
orders.68 They help to clear out and preserve the civil-society space for the 
exercise of religion as well as the enjoyment of other rights, liberties, and 
freedoms. They contain and check power. In addition, they are among the 
conditions—they are part of the infrastructure—that make the exercise of 
religious (and other) freedoms possible. Jack Balkin has made this point 
with respect to the “infrastructure of free expression,”69 noting that the 
freedom of expression requires “more than mere absence of government 
censorship or prohibition to thrive; [it] also require[s] institutions, practices 
 
 63. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court 1952 Term—Foreword: Political Theory and the 
Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1953). 
 64. Compare ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF 
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 2, 139 (2012) (developing an idea of “permeable sovereignty”), 
with Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the Church” and the Authority of the State, 21 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 145, 146 (2013) (arguing that special treatment of religion is not appropriately 
conceptualized as “freedom of the church” because the church is not a separate sphere of authority over 
which a state has no jurisdiction). 
 65. Cf. Koppelman, supra note 64, at 164 (“[T]he law decides which things are more important 
than the law. Constitutional law constrains the state, but it is still law, not something outside the law.”). 
 66. Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 963–64 
(1991). 
 67. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE 
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 78 (Image Books 1964) (1960). 
 68. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religious Liberty, Church Autonomy, and the Structure of 
Freedom, in CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 267, 267 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank 
S. Alexander eds., 2011); Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 42, at 274. 
 69. See Jack M. Balkin, Address at the Second Access to Knowledge Conference at Yale 
University: Two Ideas for Access to Knowledge—the Infrastructure of Free Expression and Margins of 
Appreciation (Apr. 27, 2007) (transcript available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/two-ideas-for-
access-to-knowledge.html). 
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and technological structures that foster and promote [it].”70 That is, the 
freedom of expression is not only enjoyed by and through but also depends 
on the existence and flourishing of what Paul Horwitz calls “First 
Amendment Institutions.”71 In my view, religious freedom also has and 
requires an “infrastructure” and this infrastructure, in turn, requires 
pluralism. Like free expression, religious freedom is not exercised only by 
individuals. Like free expression, its exercise requires more than an 
individual with something to say. Like free expression, it involves more 
than protecting a solitary conscience. The freedom of religion is not only 
lived and experienced through institutions, it is also protected, nourished, 
and facilitated by them. This is true as a matter of fact and as a matter of 
American constitutional law. 
Our conversations about religious accommodations in the age of civil 
rights and, more specifically, our laws and policies having to do with the 
reach, application, and content of antidiscrimination laws and values should 
be animated by a commitment to pluralism in both of these senses. It does 
not have to be, and should not be, a feature of this “age” that we ignore or 
downplay important questions about both the principled and the practical 
limits on the reach, application, and content of civil rights laws. When we 
design antidiscrimination and other civil rights laws, and when we use 
mechanisms such as conditional spending and access to public spaces and 
program funds to promote antidiscrimination and civil rights values, we 
should pay more attention than we sometimes do to the reasons why 
discrimination is wrong, when it is wrong. We should consider carefully 
whether, how, and to what extent, consistent with pluralism in both of the 
senses sketched above, governments like ours may or should prohibit or 
discourage it.72 It is clearly part of the civil rights enterprise to identify 
wrongful discrimination and to take regulatory and other steps to prevent, 
remedy, discourage, and denounce it. At the same time, it is not the case 
that “discrimination” is always or necessarily wrong, nor is it always the 
case that governments should or may regulate or discourage it, even when 
it is. After all, we discriminate—we draw lines, identify limits, include and 
exclude, make judgments, and act on the basis of preferences—all the time 
and often for good or at least tolerable reasons.73 
 
 70. Jack M. Balkin, The Infrastructure of Religious Freedom, BALKINIZATION (May 5, 2007, 
3:15 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/05/infrastructure-of-religious-freedom.html. 
 71. PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013). 
 72. I develop these suggestions in more detail in Garnett, supra note 41, from which some of 
what follows is taken or adapted. 
 73. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, 
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151 (1992) (“All of us well-socialized Westerners 
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Even in “the age of civil rights,” there is no reason for governments 
like ours to ban, regulate, or disapprove discrimination that is not, all things 
considered, wrong. Of course, we do and will continue to disagree about 
what it is that makes discrimination wrong. My own view is that the reason 
discrimination is wrong, when it is wrong, has to do with what I take to be 
the fact that every person is created, sustained, and loved by God and has 
been bestowed an equal dignity that should not be violated. This is as true 
for all of us as it is for some, and it directs and constrains how we ought 
and ought not to treat each other and how our governments may and may 
not treat us.74 In any event, we have good reasons, sounding in pluralism, 
for insisting that governments should not prevent, correct, or even 
discourage all instances of wrongful discrimination. Some wrongs and bad 
acts are beyond a constitutionally and morally limited government’s power 
to correct; some are too difficult or costly to identify, let alone regulate. 
Others are, put simply, none of the government’s business.75 A government 
committed to the civil rights enterprise should oppose, discourage, or 
prohibit wrongful discrimination—conduct that wrongly excludes persons 
from or pushes persons to the margins of the full life of the political 
community—when doing so is within its constitutionally limited powers, is 
consistent with pluralism, and makes sense, all things considered. 
Sometimes, then, a political community that is committed to religious 
freedom and, and among, civil rights will protect a right to discriminate.76 
Sometimes, as with the Civil Rights Act, or the Fourteenth Amendment, it 
will regulate or prohibit the exercise of that right. Sometimes, a community 
will discourage or disincentivize it.77 Sometimes it will disapprove but 
 
know that discrimination against other human beings is wrong. Yet we also realize, if we think about it 
at all, that we discriminate against others routinely and inevitably.”). 
 74. Cf. Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A Nonreligious Ground?, 54 EMORY 
L.J. 97, 102 (2005) (“[E]very human being has inherent dignity—and that therefore no one should deny 
that any human being has, or treat any human being as if she lacks, inherent dignity.”). 
 75. Cf. Koppelman, supra note 16, at 1891 (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against laws 
respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the 
business of government to compose official prayers for any group.” (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421, 423 (1962))). 
 76. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132, S. Ct. 694 
(2012). 
 77. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 901–902, 78 Stat. 241, 266–67. 
See generally COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY? HOW 
DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY (2012). But see Inazu, supra note 
53. Inazu notes, for example, that “while not every government funding decision is constitutionally 
problematic or in tension with a confident pluralism, some may be. We might be especially concerned 
when government imposes ideological constraints on generally available funding offered in settings that 
welcome and encourage a diversity of viewpoints and ideas.” Id. at 608. 
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tolerate it. And, sometimes, the political community should be entirely 
unbothered and uninterested. Reading the “times” correctly is challenging 
and I do not expect that there is a neat and tidy formula that could 
determine reliably and uncontroversially the appropriate response (or 
nonresponse) in every situation. We will disagree over what counts as harm 
and, therefore, about whether “pluralism” actually provides a good reason 
for tolerating or enduring harms caused by or associated with religious 
exercise. We cannot avoid trade-offs, compromises, sacrifices, and perhaps 
even “tragedy.”78 In my view, the much-criticized-but-nevertheless-crucial 
“public-private” distinction will and should do significant work.79 So might 
Abraham Kuyper’s “pillars,”80 Walzer’s “spheres of justice,”81 Greene’s 
“permeable sovereignties,”82 and “subsidiarity” as it is understood in 
Catholic social thought.83 Still, at the end of the day, something like the 
following framework might be helpful when thinking about particular cases 
or responding to particular conflicts. 
There will be some cases—not very many, but some—where the issue 
is not really whether or not a religious institution or religiously motivated 
action should be accommodated through an exemption from an otherwise 
valid, generally applicable nondiscrimination or civil rights law. It is, 
instead, whether the secular political authority has the power to regulate, 
prohibit, or punish the action or decision in question, even assuming it is or 
resembles the kind of wrongful discrimination with which that authority 
should be concerned. Hosanna-Tabor, I think, is such a case. The question 
in these cases is best seen as one of legitimate authority or “jurisdiction.”84 
These are cases sounding more in “separation,” “autonomy,” 
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“entanglement,” and “disability” than in “accommodation” or “toleration.” 
The reasons for insisting that a secular, constitutional government lacks the 
power to answer certain questions or respond to certain decisions—even 
wrongful ones—are not undermined by the goals and values of the civil 
rights enterprise and are not inimical to that enterprise’s success, properly 
understood. 
The next category is also probably best viewed not as a place for 
accommodation and exemption, but for neutrality and toleration. I am 
thinking here of cases involving conditional spending, public forums, 
access to public lands, and even public contracting. This admittedly large 
category would include a case like Christian Legal Society, or the question 
that is presented in cases about whether to allow the Boy Scouts to use 
public lands notwithstanding their policy (or, perhaps, their former policy) 
of excluding gay men from service as troop leaders,85 or the ongoing 
controversy about whether public universities should de-recognize 
Christian student groups that reject “all comers” policies.86 Even in the 
“age of civil rights,” it makes sense—as John Inazu has explained87—for 
governments not to leverage too heavy-handedly their ownership of 
property and their management of forums in order to penalize or discourage 
nonstate groups, associations, and societies whose internal practices and 
policies do not mirror those that we—correctly—expect of government 
agencies.88 True, governments will sometimes have good reason not to 
subsidize, support, or promote practices (including expression) they 
conclude are harmful, but the “viewpoint neutrality” often required by the 
First Amendment seems an appropriate aspiration. 
A third category, and one whose coverage and boundaries will be very 
sharply contested, is the category where we really are negotiating a conflict 
between religious exercise and a civil rights law or policy that targets 
activities or decisions that are presumptively wrongful and that are within 
the power (and the practical competence) of the government to regulate or 
prohibit. It is in this category that the questions being confronted are 
questions of accommodation, compromise, and concession. Our 
government has the power to regulate or ban drugs it determines to be 
 
 85. See Dan Levine, Scouts Can Lease Public Land, Despite Stance on Gays: Court, REUTERS 
(Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/20/us-usa-boyscouts-ruling-
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 86. See John Inazu, The Perverse Effects of the “All Comers” Requirement, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY 
(Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2014/09/15/the-perverse-effects-of-the-all-comers-
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 87. Inazu, supra note 53. 
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dangerous, but it decides (or does not decide) to accommodate religious 
believers and communities who use that drug in their religious worship.89 
At least some of our governments have the power to regulate land-use and 
building-construction, but they decide to accommodate religious interests 
that are substantially and unnecessarily burdened by such regulations.90 
Our government has the power to enact and collect taxes of various kinds, 
but it decides (or does not decide) to exempt parsonages or property owned 
by churches. This category reflects the fact that, as Michael McConnell put 
it, “between the accommodations compelled by the Free Exercise 
Clause”—at least some of which, discussed above, might not really be 
accommodations at all—“and the benefits to religion prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause there exists a class of permissible government actions 
toward religion, which have as their purpose and effect the facilitation of 
religious liberty.”91 Identifying these permissible and all-things-considered 
warranted actions is, again, difficult, and there are a variety of tests and 
standards we might design and employ for this purpose. The key point, 
though, is that this effort is not only consistent with what should be our 
aspirations for the “age of civil rights,” it also honors and reflects those 
aspirations. The generous and sympathetic accommodation of religion is a 
crucial part of, not an obstacle to, the practice and promotion of civil rights. 
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